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Wegmann v. Tramontin, 1 a case involving an oral contract, a prescribed debt, and a divorced couple who has been engaged in onagain, off-again litigation with one another in Louisiana courts for
more than thirty years, represents a quality example of a court in a
mixed jurisdiction seamlessly applying both civilian principles,
namely the obligations articles of the Louisiana Civil Code, and relevant common law authority to solve a legal problem. It shows that
the civilian tradition remains strong in Louisiana courts, but not to
the exclusion of common law methodology, and that the two need
not be thought of as, and indeed cannot practically be, mutually exclusive in a mixed jurisdiction like Louisiana.

∗ J.D. (May, 2017), Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. The author would like to thank Professor Olivier Moréteau for his guidance
and assistance throughout the writing of this case note.
1. Wegmann v. Tramontin 2015-0561 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/13/16), 186 So. 3d
236, writ denied, 2016-0276 (La. 4/4/16), 190 So. 3d 1209.
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I. BACKGROUND
Cynthia Wegmann and Gregory Tramontin 2 were married in
1981 and separated in 1985. During marriage, the couple had
founded the USAgencies Insurance Company, and stock in that
company was the primary asset of the community of acquets and
gains existing between them at the time of their separation. Pursuant
to a partition agreement reached in 1988, 3 Ms. Wegmann received
$25,000 from Mr. Tramontin in exchange for all rights to her USAgencies stock. However, in 1994, she sued to rescind the partition
agreement based on lesion beyond moiety. 4 She alleged that her
shares of USAgencies stock were worth significantly more, and she
had transferred her rights to the stock “based on erroneous information that [the company] had little or no value.” 5 She succeeded
on this claim at the trial court level, receiving a $1,758,571.64 damages award in the 19th Judicial District Court in 2004, but the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal overturned the decision, holding
that her original claim had prescribed. 6
The First Circuit’s 2005 decision in Tramontin v. Tramontin
seemed to be the final word on the matter as far as Louisiana courts
were concerned, but on April 18, 2010, the controversy was resurrected in the form of an alleged oral contract between Ms. Wegmann
and Mr. Tramontin purportedly obligating Ms. Wegmann to “willingly support Mr. Tramontin in his pending divorce litigation in East
2. Readers in Louisiana and the Las Vegas area of Nevada may know Gregory Tramontin as “Greg, the GoAuto Guy,” a recurring character in television
advertisements for the GoAuto Insurance Company, which Mr. Tramontin
founded in 2009. See GoAuto Insurance, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=nftho_3FUpI.
3. Tramontin v. Tramontin, 2004-2286 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/05), 928 So.
2d 29, 30.
4. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2589 (2016).
5. Id. at 30-31. In fact, Mr. Tramontin had sold his USAgencies stock in
1988. In return, he had received twenty-five shares of Liberty Underwriters, a
successor company, and a contract guaranteeing his employment with Liberty at
$80,000 per year. However, Liberty proceeded soon thereafter to terminate his
employment, resulting in litigation whereby Mr. Tramontin was awarded a $2.2
million judgment and the buyback of his Liberty stock for $200,000.
6. Tramontin, 928 So. 2d at 34.
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Baton Rouge Parish with his then-wife,” in exchange for
“$3,000,000 to $5,000,000 for her ownership in U.S. Agencies [sic]
Insurance Co.” 7 The contract allegedly promised further that, “The
first portion of the $3,000,000 would be tendered to [Ms. Wegmann]
after she sold the house she was living in,” the remainder to be provided on an “‘as-needed basis.’” 8 Evidently, Ms. Wegmann held up
her end of the bargain, selling her house and supporting Mr. Tramontin in his divorce action by attending court hearings and being
“available to testify truthfully.” 9 Mr. Tramontin refused to pay, and
Ms. Wegmann sued him in the Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans for “breach of contract and fraud.” 10 Mr. Tramontin pled
exceptions of prescription, res judicata, no cause of action, and
vagueness in response. 11 The trial court granted his exception of no
cause of action, dismissing Ms. Wegmann’s claim with prejudice.
Ms. Wegmann appealed.
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, Ms. Wegmann
assigned the following errors: that the District Court’s signed judgment and oral reasons for judgment were inconsistent, that the District Court erred by not finding that she and Mr. Tramontin had perfected a valid and enforceable oral contract, and finally that the District Court should have dismissed her case without prejudice had it
correctly decided that her petition did not state a cause of action.12
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court in
full. 13
Ms. Wegmann’s first assignment of error was held to be without
merit as the court found no conflict between the trial court’s oral
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Wegmann, 186 So. 3d at 238.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 238.
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reasons for judgment and the written judgment. 14 Had there been
one, the conflict would have been disposed of by a jurisprudential
rule that “where there is a conflict between the judgment and its
written reasons, the judgment controls . . . [and] the same reasoning
applies where there is a conflict between a written judgment and oral
reasons for judgment.” 15
Mr. Tramontin’s exception of no cause of action was found to
have been properly granted because an oral contract to pay a prescribed debt and a contract for an undeterminable sum are unenforceable under Louisiana Civil Code articles 1847 and 1973, and a
contract to pay a fact witness for testimony is void as against public
policy. 16 The court’s treatment of this assignment of error will be
discussed in further detail infra.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that Ms. Wegmann’s petition
was properly dismissed with prejudice as amendment would have
been futile under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 934,
which provides that when, “the grounds of the objection raised
through the exception cannot be . . . removed . . . the action, claim,
demand, issue, or theory shall be dismissed,” with prejudice. 17

14. Id. at 239. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion relates that Ms. Wegmann had
argued in the trial court that Mr. Tramontin had “contracted based on a ‘moral
obligation to give her the money,’” to which the trial judge had remarked, “Well,
if the contract is based upon a moral consideration on the defendant’s part, he’ll
have to answer to a higher authority than me if he violates that. But for the purposes of the law of the State of Louisiana I have to grant the Exception. It’s prescribed. It’s res judicata.”
15. Id. See Arbourgh v. Sweet Basil Bistro, Inc., 98-2218, p. 14 (La. App. 4
Cir. 5/19/99); 740 So. 2d 186, 192, writ denied, 99-2942 (La. 12/17/99); 751 So.
2d 883; Slaughter v. Bd. Of Sup’rs of S. Univ. & Agr. & Mech. Coll., 2010-1049
p. 37 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/2/11); 76 So. 3d 438, 459, writ denied, 2011-2110 (La.
1/13/12); 77 So. 3d 970; see also Hebert v. Hebert; 351 So. 2d 1199, 1200 (La.
1977).
16. Id. at 241.
17. Id. See Massiha v. Beahm, 2007-0137 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/15/07); 966 So.
2d 87.
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III. COMMENTARY
The Fourth Circuit declined to grant legal enforceability to the
alleged contract under Louisiana Civil Code articles 1847 and 1973,
as well as on public policy grounds.
A. Article 1847
Article 1847 reads in full, “Parol evidence is inadmissible to establish either a promise to pay the debt of a third person or a promise
to pay a debt extinguished by prescription.” 18 A brief and seemingly
straightforward article, the Fourth Circuit explains that it stands for
the proposition that, “an oral contract to pay a prescribed debt is
unenforceable.” 19 Thus, because Ms. Wegmann asserted in her initial pleading that the amount of money she bargained for under the
purported contract represented what she believed she was owed by
Mr. Tramontin for her shares of USAgencies stock under the 1988
partition agreement, and that debt was held prescribed by the First
Circuit in Tramontin v. Tramontin, 20 the article thus rendered the
contract unenforceable and Ms. Wegmann with no cause of action.
As Revision Comment (e) explains, article 1847 was originally
article 2278 when the Code was promulgated in 1870. Because it
has no analog in the Code Napoléon, the article is “no doubt [reflective] of the influence of the common law Statute of Frauds” on postbellum Louisiana. 21 Here we have a Code article that reflects the
creeping influence of the common law of Louisiana’s neighbors not
only on its jurisprudence, but also on its positive law. Like the common law Statute of Frauds, the article creates not necessarily a rule
of law, but instead an evidentiary rule; namely, that a court may not

18.
19.
20.
21.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1847 (2016).
Wegmann, 186 So. 3d at 240.
Tramontin, 928 So. 2d at 33.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1847, Revision Comment (e) (2016).
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admit parol evidence to prove the existence of certain classes of contracts, and therefore courts may not imbue such contracts with legal
enforceability when not evidenced by a writing.
There is an element of friction between the common law and the
Civil Code at play in this controversy: the civilian concept of the
natural or moral obligation to pay a prescribed debt, enumerated in
Louisiana Civil Code articles 1760 and 1761, 22 is significantly
weakened by the incorporation of the Statute of Frauds into the
Code. A natural obligation is typically understood as an obligation
that is created by a moral duty to act, 23 but one that nevertheless is
not legally enforceable in the manner of a conventional or general
obligation with civil effects (known as a “civil obligation”). The
Code and Louisiana jurisprudence nevertheless grant enforceability
to some promises to pay a debt, which represents a natural obligation, thus turning the natural obligation into a civil one. 24 This process, created by the provision of article 1761 that states, “A contract
made for the performance of a natural obligation is onerous,” takes
place when a debtor’s promise to perform a natural obligation “binds
him to the creditor by a civil obligation of which the natural one is
the cause.” 25 Even if Mr. Tramontin’s oral promise to pay a prescribed debt to Ms. Wegmann had been sufficient to convert a previously existing natural obligation into a judicially enforceable civil
one, Louisiana’s incorporation of the Statute of Frauds into article
1847 would still operate to make such a civil obligation impossible
22. “A natural obligation is not enforceable by judicial action. Nevertheless,
whatever has been freely performed in compliance with a natural obligation may
not be reclaimed. A contract made for the performance of a natural obligation is
onerous.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1761 (2016).
23. Id. at art. 1762. A debt extinguished by prescription is expressly defined
as a natural obligation in Civil Code article 1762: “Examples of circumstances
giving rise to a natural obligation are: (1) When a civil obligation has been extinguished by prescription . . . .”
24. “If the obligor makes a promise to perform his natural obligation, that
promise, though informally made, gives the creditor an action to enforce it, but …
in such a case the obligor thorough his promise turns the natural obligation into a
civil one.” SAÚL LITVINOFF & RONALD J. SCALISE, JR., 5 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE,
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS § 2.1 (2d. ed., West 2016).
25. Id. at § 2.23.
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to enforce. Such a civil obligation would have been created by oral
contract, and parol evidence would continue to be inadmissible to
prove its existence in court.
Because of the unusual nature of the alleged debt in this case—
an alleged lesionary conveyance in a partition agreement evidenced
by an actually fairly unrelated damages award in an amount far exceeding the original value of the stock in controversy—it is hard to
know exactly how it should have been treated. Indeed, whether the
amount prayed for by Ms. Wegmann can even properly be called a
“debt” at all. The First Circuit held in Tramontin v. Tramontin that
Ms. Wegmann’s lesion claim had prescribed because she had not
brought it within five years of the execution of the agreement under
Civil Code article 1413, and refused to find an interruption of prescription for reason of contra non valentem agere nulla currit
praescriptio (no prescription runs against a person unable to act). 26
The court here disposed of this alleged debt easily by characterizing
it as a prescribed debt which no debtor can create an enforceable
oral contract to pay; but if Ms. Wegmann had been allowed to amend
her pleading to state that the money bargained for under the purported oral contract was not in fact representative of the amount she
alleged she was owed for her share of USAgencies stock, this would
have been perhaps a much more difficult question. Surely one that
could not have been disposed of by Mr. Tramontin’s exception of
no cause of action in the trial court. 27
Had Ms. Wegmann been allowed to amend her petition to remove the prescription problem, there would have simply existed an
alleged oral contract for payment in exchange for certain acts. In
such a case, the admissibility of parol evidence to prove the contract’s validity would be controlled not by article 1847, but instead
by its sister article, article 1846—formerly article 2277 of the Code

26. Tramontin, 928 So. 2d at 32.
27. Wegmann, 186 So. 3d at 240.
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of 1870, and transferred into the current code keeping its spot directly before article 2278, now 1847—which states that a contract
the object of which has a value over $500, “must be proved by at
least one witness and other corroborating circumstances.” 28 Indeed,
the court tells us that Ms. Wegmann claimed that “witnesses could
corroborate the details of the contract,” but, “such evidence would
not be admissible.” 29 However, if the alleged oral contract were not
representative of a promise to pay a prescribed debt, it would necessarily fall under article 1846, and that article would expressly admit
witness testimony related to the details of the alleged contract. The
trial court disposed of this issue by granting Mr. Tramontin’s exception of no cause of action and dismissing Ms. Wegmann’s petition
with prejudice, reasoning that because Ms. Wegmann had memorialized her understanding that the $3 to $5 million bargained for in
the alleged contract represented her purported share of USAgencies,
that fact was judicially admitted and could not be contradicted by an
amended petition. 30 Therefore, the trial court reasoned, and the
Fourth Circuit affirmed, amendment of the petition to cure the defect
that allowed Mr. Tramontin’s exception of no cause of action to be
granted would be impossible and as such dismissal with prejudice
was required under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 934.
B. Article 1973
The court held that the purported oral contract is also without
effect under Louisiana Civil Code article 1973, which states, in pertinent part, “The quantity of a contractual object may be undetermined, provided it is determinable.” 31 The court writes that, “Where
an obligation is ‘too indeterminate’ to meet the requirements of article 1973, the ‘obligation [is] unenforceable because it is without

28.
29.
30.
31.

LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1846 (2016).
Wegmann, 186 So. 3d at 240.
Id. at 241.
LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1973 (2016).
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cause.’” 32 The court concluded that because the purported contract
was for an amount of money between $3 and $5 million to be tendered on the sale of Ms. Wegmann’s house, and the remainder to be
paid on an “as-needed basis,” 33 the purported contract failed as to
cause due to an indeterminable object.
Cause is defined in the first paragraph of article 1967 as “the
reason why a party obligates himself,” and is one of the crucial ingredients of an enforceable contract without which a valid contract
cannot exist. Quite notable is that the second paragraph of that article is the Code’s definition of and express authorization for courts
to apply the doctrine of detrimental reliance. 34 Detrimental reliance
is yet another common law principle that has been absorbed into the
law of Louisiana and memorialized in the Code. Louisiana courts
have held that “Louisiana law allows a party to recover under the
doctrine of detrimental reliance even if no formal, valid, or enforceable contract existed.” 35 Here, the court makes no mention of the
doctrine of detrimental reliance, as it appears Ms. Wegmann did not
raise the issue. 36 This may have been a missed opportunity as it is
undisputed that Ms. Wegmann did indeed sell her home in reliance
upon the purported contract between her and Mr. Tramontin.
32. Id. (citing TAC Amusement Co. v. Henry, 238 So. 2d 393,400 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1970)).
33. Id.
34. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1967, para. 2 (2016):
A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have
known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his
detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying. Recovery
may be limited to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a
result of the promisee’s reliance on the promise. Reliance on a gratuitous
promise made without required formalities is not reasonable.
35. Babkow v. Morris Bart, P.L.C., 98-0256 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/98), 726
So. 2d 423, 429; State v. Murphy Cormier Gen. Contractors, Inc., 2015-111 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 6/3/15), 170 So. 3d 370, 380, writ denied, 2015-1297 (La. 9/25/15),
178 So. 3d 573 (“A formal, written, underlying contract is not necessary to prove
the existence of a binding contractual agreement where the plaintiff can show a
promise was made, he relied on the promise, the promise was broken, and as a
result he suffered loss.”).
36. Original brief of Defendant-Appellee, 2015 WL 4727336 (La.App. 4
Cir.); Reply brief of Cynthia Wegmann, Plaintiff-Appellant, 2015 WL 4880096
(La.App. 4 Cir.).
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C. Void as Against Public Policy
Finally, the court upheld the trial court’s determination that the
alleged oral contract was a contract to secure live testimony through
remuneration in excess of an amount fixed by law, 37 and therefore
void as against public policy. This finding is notable, as it is sui generis in Louisiana jurisprudence, being the first recorded opinion to
apply this particular public policy consideration, although it has
been known to the common law for many years. 38 The court’s ruling
seems to have the effect of invalidating all contracts to secure live
testimony in exchange for an amount of money greater than that set
by law as against public policy within the jurisdiction of the Fourth
Circuit. It is an open question, then, whether the remaining Louisiana Courts of Appeal will adopt the rule. 39

37. Compensation of witnesses in Louisiana is set by LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13:3661 (2016).
38. The court relies on three of the iconic volumes of common law doctrine
to reach its determination: Williston on Contracts: “A bargain to pay one who is
amenable to process a further sum for attending as a witness is generally invalid,”
RICHARD A. LORD, 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:6 (4th ed., Lawyers Cooperative Publ’g), The Restatement (First) of Contracts: “A bargain to pay one who
is subject to legal process, a sum for his attendance as a witness in addition to that
fixed by law is illegal.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 552 (1932), and
the Corpus Juris Segundum: “When a witness ‘is to be paid more than his or her
legal fees, or other elements occur which tend to show that his or her evidence
may be improperly influenced, the contract is against public policy.’” 17A C.J.S.
CONTRACTS § 304).
39. In fact, the Fourth Circuit’s decision seems to go beyond what had previously been the law regarding payment to witnesses. See Dane S. Ciolino, Can I
make Any Payments to a Fact Witness?, LOUISIANA LEGAL ETHICS Blog
(Aug. 8, 2013) https://perma.cc/382K-SNSX; Dane S. Ciolino, a distinguished
scholar of Louisiana Legal Ethics, has written that, at least regarding attorney discipline, “the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, relevant statutory law, case
law, and persuasive authority all indicate that a lawyer should not be subjected to
discipline for paying a fact witness if: 1. the payment is not motivated by an improper purpose, such as to obtain “inside information,” to obtain false testimony
or to influence the content of the witness’s testimony; 2. the amount paid merely
compensates the witness for the reasonable value of the time and expenses actually incurred by the witness; and, 3. the amount of the payment is not contingent
on the witness’s testimony.” After Wegmann v. Tramontin, however, agreements
to remit such formerly permissible payments to witnesses in exchange for their
availability to testify may be unenforceable within the jurisdiction of the Fourth
Circuit.

